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LIMITS ON PARTY AUTONOMY IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 
Giuditta Cordero-Moss* 
INTRODUCTION 
International contracts are often drafted in a rather 
standardized manner, making use of so-called boilerplate clauses that 
aim at regulating the interpretation and operation of the contract. In 
addition, they often contain an arbitration clause that requires the 
parties to submit all disputes arising out of or relating to the contract 
to arbitration, thus excluding any involvement of national courts. 
Standardised contract terms, including a boilerplate legal 
framework for the contract and arbitration clauses, are elements that 
seem to indicate an intention to render the contract self-sufficient. By 
including a detailed and extensive regulation of the legal relationship 
between the parties, the contract aims at making national law 
dispensable. If national law is not relevant, and the only basis for 
regulating the parties’ legal relationship is the contract, it becomes 
possible and meaningful to standardise contract terms, even when 
contracts are intended to be implemented in a variety of legal systems, 
without the need to adapt them to the legal framework of the specific 
transaction. The impression of self-sufficiency is enhanced by the 
exclusion of national courts and the referral to arbitration instead. A 
                                                 
*   Director of the Department of Private Law, Professor of Law at the 
University of Oslo. I presented the main lines of this article at the International 
Academy of Consumer and Commercial Law in Istanbul, July 2014. The article is 
originally published in the Oslo Law Journal 2014 No. 1, and is reproduced here with 
the consent of the publisher. The article was based on a paper that I presented at the 
Arbitration Forum of the Center for Transnational Litigation, Arbitration and 
Commercial Law, New York University, on February 3, 2014. 
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closed circuit is created, dominated by the will of the parties: the 
relationship is regulated by terms of contract agreed to by the parties, 
and disputes are solved by a private body bound by the contractual 
terms set forth by the parties. External sources, including national law, 
may seem redundant. 
Self-sufficiency may seem a realistic goal as long as the legal 
relationship remains within the borders of the closed circuit. This 
assumes that the legal relationship is, at any time, subject to the terms 
and legal framework agreed between the parties. 
There are, however, situations in which this assumption may 
turn out not to be true. For example, if a difference arises between the 
parties, and the parties disagree on what is the legal framework 
(notwithstanding that they may have agreed in the past, prior to the 
conflict); or if third parties’ interests or public interests are affected, 
and mandatory rules or policies override the parties’ agreement; or if 
the agreed terms or legal framework may be interpreted in more than 
one way or need specification by external sources. In these situations, 
the closed circuit is interrupted and recourse to external sources 
becomes necessary. To a certain extent, guidance may be sought in 
non-national, non-authoritative rules that may permit a uniform, 
transnational solution and thus reinstate the closed circuit. Where such 
a uniform guidance is not available, the closed circuit is interrupted 
again. When a full closed circuit cannot be assumed, party autonomy 
may be limited. 
To assess the limits of party autonomy, it will be necessary to 
analyse the above mentioned situations where interference with the 
closed circuit may occur. Section II will briefly discuss to what extent 
the legal framework provided by the contract and possibly given effect 
to in arbitration may resist control and interference by national law; 
Section III will discuss to what extent the terms of the contract are 
capable of being interpreted in a uniform manner; Section IV will 
discuss to what extent transnational sources may provide a uniform 
legal framework capable of replacing national governing law; Section 
V will investigate to what extent the principle of faithful interpretation 
to the wording of the contract may be a guiding principle for arbitral 
tribunals. 
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I.         EXTERNAL LIMITS TO PARTY AUTONOMY: COURT CONTROL 
The closed circuit described above meets the expectations as 
long as the arbitral tribunal gives effect to the will of the parties as 
embodied in the contract and the award is complied with by the losing 
party or enforced by the courts. The closed circuit fails when an arbitral 
award becomes invalid or unenforceable as a consequence of having 
given effect to the contract terms. 
International arbitration is an alternative method of solving 
contractual disputes that is based on the consent of the parties. If the 
parties agree to submit their disputes to arbitration, then the ordinary 
courts will have to decline jurisdiction on those disputes, and the only 
possible mechanism to solve the dispute will be the arbitration that has 
been chosen by the parties. If, on the contrary, the parties have not 
entered into an arbitration agreement, disputes between them will have 
to be solved by the national court that has jurisdiction. An arbitral 
tribunal, in other words, bases its existence upon the parties’ 
agreement. Moreover, the parties determine the composition of the 
arbitral tribunal, the procedural rules that have to be followed by the 
arbitral tribunal, the scope of the tribunal’s competence and its power. 
The arbitral tribunal is bound to follow the instructions of the parties; 
otherwise, it exceeds the power that the parties have conferred on it. 
If the arbitral tribunal exceeds its power, neither its jurisdiction nor its 
award are founded on the parties’ agreement, and there is, 
consequently, no legal basis for either of the two. These basic elements 
of arbitration are based on the 1958 New York Convention on 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 6, 
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, ratified by 155 countries1 and 
are reflected in most national arbitration laws, as well as in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 
adopted in sixty-nine countries.2 
                                                 
1   For a list of ratifications, see UNCITRAL, Status Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_st
atus.html (last visited on June 19, 2015). 
2   For a list of Model Law countries, see UNCITRAL, Status 
UNCISTRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with 
amendments as adopted in 2006, 
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Arbitration’s dependence on the parties’ will, which is so 
uniformly recognised, is an important factor strengthening the opinion 
that arbitration is a private matter between the parties, that the arbitral 
tribunal is bound to follow the parties’ instructions, and that national 
courts or state laws have no possibility of interfering with the parties’ 
will. This opinion is certainly confirmed by the observation that the 
vast majority of arbitral awards are complied with voluntarily by the 
losing party. The parties agree to submit the dispute to arbitration, then 
they instruct the arbitral tribunal as to the scope of the dispute, the 
rules to be applied, etc., then the losing party recognizes the 
arbitration’s result and complies voluntarily with the award. In 
situations such as this one, the totality of the arbitration takes place in 
the private sphere of the parties. There is no point of contact between 
the national courts and the arbitration. Consequently, no national 
judge may decide to override the parties’ contract or expectations by 
considering an agreement invalid due to violations of E.U. competition 
law3 or a contract not binding due to one of the parties not having legal 
capacity according to the law to which it is subject.4 The arbitrators 
may or may not decide to apply these rules, but, as long as the losing 
party accepts the result of the arbitration, there will be no possibility 
for any judge to verify the arbitrator’s decision. In these cases, 
therefore, limits to party autonomy are relevant only to the extent that 
the parties request the arbitral tribunal apply state law or the tribunal 
elects to do so on its own motion. When the losing party does not 
voluntarily comply with the award, the courts will intervene. In these 
cases, the closed circuit is interrupted and limitations to party 
autonomy may become relevant. 
The formal framework for arbitration grants it a relative 
autonomy, which actually gives the appearance of an autonomous 
                                                 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitr
ation_status.html (last visited June 19, 2015). 
3   Violation of E.U. competition law is, according to a controversial ECJ 
decision, to be deemed as a violation of ordre public and therefore prevents 
enforcement of the award under the New York Convention. Case C-126/97, Eco 
Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l NV, 1999 E.C.R. I-03055. 
4   That each of the parties’ own law governs their legal capacity, quite 
irrespective of which law the parties chose to govern the contract, is regulated by the 
New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law and was confirmed by the 
Swedish Court of Appeal. Hovrätt (HOVR) (Court of Appeals) 2007-12-17 T3108-
06 (Swed.); see KLUWER ARBITRATION, 6 ITA MONTHLY REPORT, MAY (2008). 
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system. The main instrument upon which arbitration is founded, as 
previously mentioned, is the New York Convention, that binds the 
courts of these countries to recognise arbitration agreements and thus 
dismiss claims that are covered by an arbitration agreement, as well as 
to recognise and enforce arbitral awards without any review of the 
merits or of the application of law – with only a restrictive and 
exhaustive list of grounds to refuse recognition and enforcement. 
UNCITRAL Model Law is also an important instrument, issued in 
1985 and revised in 2006, which has contributed to a considerable 
harmonisation of the areas of arbitration law that are not covered by 
the New York Convention. The UNCITRAL Model Law is, in turn, 
based on the same principles as the New York Convention, which 
means that together these instruments create a harmonised legal 
framework for arbitration. Both instruments give a central role to the 
will of the parties. The power of the arbitral tribunal actually derives 
from the agreement of the parties; therefore, the arbitral tribunal is 
obliged to follow the parties’ instructions in respect of the scope of the 
dispute, the law to be applied, and the remedies to be granted. 
All this confirms, to a large extent, the understanding of 
arbitration as an autonomous system, based on the will of the parties 
and detached from national law. However, both the New York 
Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law refer to national, non-
harmonised legislation in a number of instances and thus reduce in 
few, but significant, respects the detachment of arbitration from 
national laws. Thus, national law defines what may be subject to 
arbitration, when an award is deemed to conflict with public policy, 
what the criteria are for an arbitration agreement to be binding on the 
parties, what mandatory rules of procedure apply, and when an award 
is valid.5 In these situations, the closed circuit is interrupted. 
For example, a contract between a Norwegian and a Ukrainian 
party was submitted by the parties to Swedish law; after a dispute arose 
and arbitration was initiated, the Ukrainian party maintained that it was 
                                                 
5   For a more extensive analysis, see Luca Radicati di Brozolo, International 
Arbitration and Domestic Law, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 
DIFFERENT FORMS AND THEIR FEATURES 40, 40-57 (Giuditta Cordero-Moss ed., 
2013); see also  Giuditta Cordero-Moss, International Arbitration is Not Only International, 
in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, DIFFERENT FORMS AND THEIR 
FEATURES 7, 7-39 (2013). 
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not bound by the contract, because its representatives had signed the 
contract in a way that did not meet the formal requirements of 
Ukrainian law; the arbitral tribunal followed the choice of Swedish law 
contained in the contract, considered the contract validly signed 
according to Swedish law and disregarded Ukrainian law as irrelevant. 
The arbitral tribunal, therefore, fulfilled the closed circuit; however, the 
award was set aside by the courts of the country where it was rendered, 
Sweden, because the legal capacity of a party is subject not to the law 
chosen by the parties in the contract, but to the law of each of the 
parties.6 The closed circuit was interrupted, and party autonomy 
restricted. 
In another example, the European Court of Justice found that 
an award would be invalid and unenforceable for violation of public 
policy if it gave effect to a contract that does not comply with 
competition law.7 Had the arbitral tribunal been willing to follow the 
terms of the contract in full, the award would not be valid or 
enforceable; this is, therefore, another limitation to party autonomy. 
Another example is a decision by a Russian court, refusing to 
enforce an award that had given effect to a shareholders agreement 
among the shareholders of a Russian company.8 The shareholders 
agreement regulated the parties’ rights and obligations in a manner that 
did not comply with Russian company law, and the court found that 
enforcing the award would have violated Russian public policy. The 
harmonised framework for arbitration is, therefore, subject to national 
law in several significant respects, and this may have an impact on the 
                                                 
6   Hovrätt (HOVR) (Court of Appeals) 2007-12-17 T3108-06 (Swed.); see 
Kluwer Arbitration, supra note 4. For a more extensive analysis, see Giuditta Cordero-
Moss, Legal Capacity, Arbitration and Private International Law, in CONVERGENCE AND 
DIVERGENCE IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – LIBER AMICORUM KURT SIEHR 
(Katharina Boele-Woelki et al. eds., 2010).  
7   Eco Swiss China Time Ltd., 1999 E.C.R. I-03055. 
8   [Ruling of the Western-Siberian District Commercial Court on March 
31, 2006], No.F04- 2109/2005(14105-А75-11) (Rus.) (regarding an arbitral award on 
a shareholder agreement between, among others, OAO Telecominvest, Sonera 
Holding BV, Telia International AB, Avenue Ltd, Santel Ltd, Janao Properties Ltd 
and IPOC International Growth Fund Ltd.). 
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enforceability of arbitration agreements and of arbitral awards, which 
in turn restricts the effects of party autonomy.9 
II.         TERMS OF CONTRACT: ABSOLUTE AND UNIFORM 
INTERPRETATION? 
With the exceptions seen in Section 1, the liberal framework 
for arbitration permits to recognise and enforce awards even if the 
award were based on a wrong interpretation of the contract or of the 
evidence, it applied the applicable law wrongly, or it applied the wrong 
law. If the award gives effect to the regulation contained in the 
contract, therefore, it will mostly be recognised and enforced even 
though the contract may have disregarded and violated the applicable 
law. Arbitration, therefore, to a large extent seems to permit relying on 
the assumption of the closed circuit. This, however, does not imply 
that party autonomy is absolute. An absolute party autonomy, not at 
all affected by external elements, assumes that the terms of the contract 
have a uniform meaning flowing from the words, and that they 
therefore may be interpreted equally in all legal systems. 
It is, however, not uncommon that contract terms need to be 
understood in light of assumptions and effects founded on the 
applicable legal framework. Even plain words may acquire different 
meanings, depending on the culture and tradition of the interpreter. 
Take an apparently self-explanatory expression such as “summer 
nights.” If read by an Italian, it will create associations with a dark and 
warm night, possibly with crickets singing and a sky full of stars. If read 
by a Norwegian, it will evoke a bright and chilly night, with the sun as 
the only visible star. If the meaning of plain words is affected by the 
context, even more so it is for terms of a contract, as they refer not to 
a natural phenomenon, but to legal effects that are created and 
supported by legal systems, which in turn use words as the most 
                                                 
9   For a more extensive analysis of the matter, see GIUDITTA CORDERO-
MOSS, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS ch. 5 (2014); see also Giuditta 
Cordero Moss, International Arbitration and the Quest for the Applicable Law, 8 GLOBAL 
JURIST 1 (2008). A research project at the University of Oslo analyses the limits that 
this may impose on party autonomy. See UiO Dep’t of Private Law, The Fac. Of 
Law, Arbitration and Party Autonomy (APA), (Nov. 17, 2009), 
http://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/english/research/projects/choice-of-law/index.html .  
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important means to create and define those legal effects. It then 
becomes even more difficult to separate the legal effects from the 
words used to express them. In this situation, it may be illusionary to 
expect that the terms of a contract have an absolute meaning, fully 
independent of any legal framework or legal tradition. 
National legal systems may differ from each other in many 
respects that are relevant to a contract, even when the systems belong 
to the same legal tradition, so-called legal family. Even more so there 
will be differences across legal families, such as the common law and 
the civil law. Modern comparative law research is inclined to consider 
this divide as overrated and largely overcome by a common core of 
European contract law. The common core reveals a certain synchrony 
between the systems on an abstract level, but it does not necessarily 
lead to harmonised solutions on a specific level. 10 Awareness about a 
common core may show that a certain principle may be recognised and 
a certain result may be achieved in a plurality of legal systems, albeit by 
employing different legal techniques. In a specific case, however, it is 
the particular legal technique employed in the contract that counts, and 
not the abstract possibility of achieving the desired result, if only the 
right legal technique had been adopted. 
A.         The Applicable Law’s Impact on Force Majeure Clauses 
An example of term of contract that may have different legal 
effects depending on the legal framework, is the so-called Force 
Majeure clause. This clause is meant to excuse a party’s non-
performance of its obligation if fulfilment was prevented by an event 
beyond that party’s control that was unforeseeable and could not be 
reasonably overcome. One question is how the requirement of 
“beyond the control” shall be interpreted. Interpretation may be 
                                                 
10   BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 
AND THE APPLICABLE LAW (Giuditta Cordero-Moss ed., 2011). This book is based 
on a research project that I ran at the University of Oslo from 2004 to 2009, and 
shows that the same contract wording may lead to diametrally different legal effects, 
depending on the governing law. See, particularly, part 3 in the book, as well as the 
Conclusion; see also INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, supra note 9, ch. 
3. 
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influenced by the legal system’s understanding of the assumptions for 
liability. 
An illustration of this situation is when a producer cannot fulfil 
its obligations, because it did not receive raw materials from its 
supplier. The question is whether failure by a party’s supplier may be 
deemed as an event falling outside of that party’s sphere of control. To 
answer this question, it is necessary to understand the purpose of the 
Force Majeure clause. 
There may be several different goals for regulations on 
exemptions from liability for non-performance. In some legal systems, 
the aim is to allocate between the parties the risk for supervening 
unexpected events according to which one of the two parties is closer 
to bear that particular risk. This approach assumes a strict liability, 
triggered irrespective of the conduct of the party that was prevented 
from performing its obligations. 
According to an alternative approach, the risk for unexpected 
events should not be borne by a party, as long as that party has acted 
diligently and cannot be blamed for the occurrence of the impediment 
- even if in an objective allocation of risk that party would be closer to 
bear such risk. 
The legal systems, that follow the criteria of the strict liability 
and the allocation of risk between the parties according to the 
respective spheres of control, would consider the choice of supplier to 
be an event falling within the sphere of control of the seller. Certainly 
this impediment would not fall within the sphere of the buyer and, 
since all risks have to be allocated between the parties, it follows that 
it must fall within the sphere of the seller. That the producer has been 
diligent in selecting its supplier and cannot be blamed for the supplier’s 
failure to deliver is not relevant. This is the approach taken by English 
law.11 
German law has a different approach. According to § 276 
BGB, if the prevented party is to be blamed for the impediment or its 
consequences, it cannot be excused from liability. If, however, the 
                                                 
11   EDWIN PEEL, TREITEL ON THE LAW OF CONTRACT, ¶. 17064 (13th ed. 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2011). 
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prevented party can prove that it has not acted negligently, it will be 
excused from liability. If the seller has operated with diligence in the 
choice of supplier, it would not be considered liable for non-
performance due to failure by the supplier. 
The distinction between Common Law and Civil Law in the 
context of liability for non-performance can be explained with the 
inclination of the English system to privilege predictability, for the sake 
of ensuring that business is carried out smoothly, rather than ensuring 
that an equitable justice is made in the specific case.12 Common Law 
allocates the risk of non-performance between the parties according to 
where it is most likely that the risk should be borne. This objective rule 
is not to be defeated by subjective criteria such as lack of negligence, 
because it would render the system less predictable. Civil Law systems 
privilege (in different degrees) the subjective elements of the specific 
case, in order to ensure that an equitable solution is reached. 
Applied to the example made above, this means that the Force 
Majeure clause may be understood differently under the different 
governing laws. As a result, in a contract containing the same wording, 
a producer who cannot fulfil its supply obligations due to failure by the 
raw materials supplier, is not excused under English law,13 whereas he 
is excluded under, for example, Norwegian law.14 
B.         The Applicable Law’s Impact on Entire Agreement Clauses 
Another example of term of contract that may be interpreted 
differently depending on the legal framework is the so-called Entire 
Agreement clause. This is a recurring clause in contract practice and 
states that the document signed by the parties contains the whole 
agreement and may not be supplemented by evidence of prior 
statements or agreements. 
The purpose of the Entire Agreement clause is to isolate the 
contract from any source or element that may be external to the 
document. This is also often emphasised by referring to the four 
                                                 
12   For a more extensive discussion and references, see INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, supra note 9, ch. 3. 
13   PEEL, supra note 11.  
14   See infra notes 32-35.  
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corners of the document as the borderline for the interpretation or 
construction of the contract. The parties’ aim is thus to exclude that 
the contract is integrated by terms or obligations that do not appear in 
the document. 
The parties are obviously entitled to regulate their interests and 
to specify the sources of their regulation. However, many legal systems 
provide for ancillary obligations deriving from the contract type,15 a 
general principle of good faith,16 or a principle preventing an abuse of 
rights.17 This means that a contract would always have to be 
understood not only on the basis of the obligations that are spelled out 
in it, but also in combination with the elements that, according to the 
applicable law, integrate it. A contract, therefore, risks having different 
content depending on the governing law: the Entire Agreement clause 
is meant to avoid this uncertainty by barring the possibility of invoking 
extrinsic elements. The Entire Agreement clause creates an illusion of 
exhaustiveness of the written obligations. 
This is, however, only an illusion: first of all, often ancillary 
obligations created by the operation of law may not be excluded by the 
contract.18 Moreover, some legal systems permit bringing evidence that 
                                                 
15   For France, see, Xavier Lagarde et al., The Romanistic Tradition: 
Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under French Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 
10, § 2. For Italy, see Art. 1347 C.c. [Civil Code] (It.); Giorgio De Nova, The Romanistic 
Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under Italian Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 
10, § 1, as well as the general considerations on Art. 1135 of the Civil Code in Section 
1. For Denmark, see Peter Møgelvang-Hansen, The Nordic Tradition: Application of 
Boilerplate Clauses Under Danish Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 1. 
16   See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Jan. 2, 2002, § 
242 (Ger.) (for the general principle on good faith in the performance of contracts); 
see Gerhard Dannemann, Common Law Based Contracts Under German Law, 
BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE 
APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, §§ 3.2-3.3 (for examples of its application by the 
Courts). 
17   See, for Russia, Ivan Zykin, The East European Tradition: Application of 
Boilerplate Clauses Under Russian Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 1.  
18   See, for France and Italy, supra note 15. For Finnish law, see Gustaf 
Möller, The Nordic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under Finnish Law, in 
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the parties’ agreement creates obligations different from those 
contained in the contract.19 Furthermore, many civilian legal systems 
openly permit the use of pre-contractual material to interpret the terms 
written in the contract.20 Finally, a strict adherence to the clause’s 
wording may, under some circumstances, be looked upon as 
unsatisfactory even under English law, in spite of the formalistic 
interpretation style that English law may employ in respect of other 
clauses.21 
                                                 
BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE 
APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 2.1. 
19   See, for Germany, BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] 
§ 309, no. 12 (Ger.), prohibiting clauses which change the burden of proof to the 
disadvantage of the other party; see Ulrich Magnus, The Germanic Tradition: Application 
of Boilerplate Clauses Under German Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 5.1.1.a. Italy, 
on the contrary, does not allow oral evidence that contradicts a written agreement. 
See Giorgio De Nova, The Romanistic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under 
Italian Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 
AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 1.  
20   In addition to Germany, supra note 19, see for France, Xavier Lagarde 
et al., The Romanistic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under French Law, in 
CORDERO-MOSS (ed.), supra note 10, § 2; for Italy, Giorgio De Nova, supra note 
15, § 4; for Denmark, Peter Møgelvang-Hansen, The Nordic Tradition: Application of 
Boilerplate Clauses Under Danish Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 2.1; for 
Norway, Viggo Hagstrøm, The Nordic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under 
Norwegian Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 3.1; for Russia, Ivan Zykin, 
The East European Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under Russian Law, in 
BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE 
APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 2.1. The situation seems to be more uncertain in 
Sweden, see Lars Gorton, The Nordic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under 
Swedish Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 
AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 5.4.2.d, and more restrictive is Finland, 
see Gustaf Möller, The Nordic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under Finnish 
Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND 
THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 2.1. 
21   See Edwin Peel, The Common Law Tradition: Application of Boilerplate 
Clauses Under English Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 2.1. 
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The effect of the clause, therefore, does not flow from its 
simple words, but is the result of a combination of the clause and of 
the governing law. 
III.        TRANSNATIONAL LAW: A UNIFORM LEGAL FRAMEWORK? 
We have seen above that contracts’ terms are not capable of 
being interpreted without making reference to the applicable legal 
framework. Even though arbitral tribunals in many situations are 
allowed to consider exclusively the terms of the contract without 
running the risk of triggering invalidity or unenforceability of the 
award, they may find that the terms of the contract are not a sufficient 
basis for the decision and must be integrated by external elements. 
Admittedly, arbitration may (to a certain extent, as was seen in Section 
1) be capable of giving effect to the regulation agreed to by the parties 
in the contract without being obliged to comply with the peculiarities 
of the applicable law. However, the terms of the contract are not self-
explanatory and have to be interpreted in light of the applicable legal 
framework, as was seen in Section 2. That the arbitral tribunal is free 
to interpret the contract and to decide how, if at all, the contract shall 
interact with the applicable law, does not give an answer to the 
question of how to interpret terms that are not self-explanatory. This 
may result in different interpretations of the same contract terms 
depending on the arbitrator’s background and inclination, and thus 
impacts on party autonomy. 
It is worthwhile exploring whether the idea of an absolute party 
autonomy may be reinstated by including a uniform legal framework 
into the closed circuit. It is often proposed that transnational sources 
may give a uniform legal framework for international contracts. 
Transnational sources are concerned with giving effect to commercial 
practice without abiding by the peculiarities of the various legal 
systems; this could be deemed to make national laws redundant. 
The differences among the various national legal systems have 
prompted various initiatives to formulate trans-national sets of rules, 
in part developed spontaneously by business practice and in part 
restated and codified by branch organizations, international 
organisations, academic fora, etc. This complex of sources goes under 
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various names, such as lex mercatoria, transnational law or soft law.22 If 
transnational sources gave an exhaustive and harmonised regime, it 
would be possible to include these sources as the only applicable legal 
framework for the contract and thus reinstate the closed circuit. 
As I argue elsewhere, however, transnational sources are not 
sufficiently precise and systematic to replace national laws23 - not to 
mention the formal circumstance that transnational sources may not, 
as a matter of private international law, govern a contract to the 
exclusion of any state laws.24 Some of the most recognized 
transnational sources – in particular, the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (UPICC) and the Principles of 
European Contract Law (PECL) – are heavily based on a general 
principle of good faith.25 Good faith is a legal standard that needs 
specification and there does not seem to be any generally 
acknowledged legal standard of good faith that is sufficiently precise 
to be applied uniformly, irrespective of the governing law. 
Moreover, these instruments grant the interpreter much room 
for interference regarding the wording of the contract – based on the 
central role given to the principle of good faith. This seems to 
contradict the very intention of standard contracts. International 
contract practice is meant to be exhaustive and self-sufficient, and not 
to be influenced by the interpreter’s legal tradition.26 Any correction by 
principles such as good faith would run counter to the expectations of 
the parties. 
                                                 
22   Literature on the subject matter is very vast. Among the works most 
frequently referred to are FILIP DE LY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEX 
MERCATORIA (1992); KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF 
THE LEX MERCATORIA (2d. ed., 2010), and Ole Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in 
International Commercial Arbitration, 34 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 747, 747-768 (1985). For 
extensive references see ROY GOODE ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW 
– TEXTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 24 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007). 
23   For a more extensive discussion, see INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS, supra note 9, §§ 2.4, 4.2.3. 
24   For a more extensive discussion, see id. § 4.2.3. 
25   For a more extensive discussion, see id. § 2.4.2. 
26   For a more extensive discussion of the ambitions of self-sufficiency in 
contract practice, id. ch. 1. 
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The same applies to the instruments developed so far in the 
ongoing work on a European contract law. The Academic Draft Frame 
of Reference, the Acquis Principles, and the Common European Sales 
Law (CESL), all largely based on the PECL, have a double approach 
to commercial contracts: they extend rules of consumer protection to 
commercial contracts (including an extensive and mandatory principle 
of good faith), and then moderate them by reserving for contrary good 
commercial practice. Reference to good commercial practice as the 
only concretisation of the principle of good faith assumes that the 
interpreter is in a position to define good commercial practice and to 
assess its content. What constitutes good commercial practice, 
however, is not clear. It may be assumed that it coincides with the 
above mentioned spontaneous or academic transnational sources that 
often are deemed to be particularly apt to govern international 
contracts and that go under the name of transnational law or lex 
mercatoria: scholarly works on the convergence of legal systems, general 
principles, restatements, and trade usages. As will be seen, these 
sources are not capable of giving a clear and harmonized picture of the 
transnational law of commercial contracts; hence, they do not give a 
clear picture of what good commercial practice is. Reference to good 
commercial practice, therefore, does not create a concrete standard of 
good faith. 
Transnational sources, thus, do not always provide a uniform 
solution. The arbitrator who is required to interpret contract terms will 
not find a definitive and uniform standard of interpretation in these 
sources, and will need to make recourse to other sources, thus 
interrupting again the closed circuit. 
A.         Interpretation of Force Majeure Clauses under Transnational 
Law 
To test the ability of transnational law to overcome the 
disparity of legal traditions, we can look at the examples made in 
Section 2 above. We saw that the expression “beyond the control” in 
Force Majeure clauses may be interpreted differently depending on the 
governing law. Does the transnational law offer a uniform solution? 
One of the most successful instruments of harmonization of contract 
law is the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (CISG), ratified by over sixty countries and looked 
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upon, especially in some academic circles,27 as embodying principles 
that are generally recognized and reach well beyond the convention’s 
scope of application. 
According to Article 79 of the CISG, a party is not liable for 
failure to perform its obligations if it proves that the failure was due to 
an impediment beyond its control that was unforeseeable and could 
not reasonably have been overcome. 
The CISG does not contain any reference to the diligence of 
the affected party as criterion for exempting it from liability; in another 
context, the convention confirms that diligence is not a criterion for 
excuse: Articles 45(1)(b) and 61(1)(b) regulate that each party may 
exercise contractual remedies for non-performance against the other 
party without having to prove any fault or negligence or lack of good 
faith on that party, nor do they mention that any evidence of diligence 
would relieve the other party from its liability. 
The Secretariat Commentary does not address the question of 
how the criterion of the sphere of control shall be interpreted, whether 
literally, or as a reference to the diligent conduct of the seller.28 Bearing 
in mind that the CISG requires it to be interpreted autonomously, 
without reference to domestic legal systems, it seems appropriate to 
apply the literal interpretation and to see Article 79 as a reference to an 
objective division of the landscape into two spheres, that of the seller 
and that of the buyer, without reference to specific actual possibilities 
to exercise control. This is confirmed by case law and doctrine, which 
affirm that procurement risk falls within the sphere of risk of the seller, 
and that therefore failure by the seller’s supplier is not deemed to fall 
outside of the seller’s sphere of responsibility (unless the relevant good 
has disappeared completely from the international market).29 In the 
                                                 
27   For a thorough analysis of the enormous impact of the CISG on 
scholars, see THE CISG AND ITS IMPACT ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 436 
(Franco Ferrari, ed., Sellier European Law Publishers, 2008). Ferrari also shows, 
however, that the level of awareness about the CISG in the business community and 
among practicing lawyers is strikingly low. Id. at 421. 
28   Commentary On The Draft Convention On Contracts For The 
International Sale Of Goods, Prepared By The Secretariat, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.97/5 (Mar. 1, 1979). 
29   See Dionysios Flambouras, The Doctrines of Impossibility of Performance and 
clausula rebus sic stantibus in the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
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comment to the second paragraph of article 79 on use of sub-
contractors, the Commentary specifies that this special rule does not 
include suppliers of raw material or of goods to the seller.30 
However, this is not the only way of understanding the 
criterion of “beyond the control.” Article 79 of the CISG may be 
interpreted differently, depending on the interpreter’s legal tradition – 
something that has been defined as “troubling.”31 
Norway implemented the CISG with the Sale of Goods Act. 
The Sale of Goods Act, in Section 27, introduced the concept of 
impediment beyond the control of the prevented party, with a literal 
translation of Article 79 of the CISG.32 By introducing this concept, 
the legislator intended to mitigate the then-existing regime, which was 
based on strict liability.33 
Norwegian legal doctrine interprets the criterion of “beyond 
the control” not as having an abstract understanding of each party’s 
sphere of control, but on the basis of the actual sphere of control of 
each party.34 Only if one party actually has the possibility of influencing 
a certain process are the events caused by that process deemed to be 
within the sphere of control of that party. That a party has started a 
process, in itself, does not mean that any events occurring in the course 
of that process are in the sphere of control of that party. The test must 
be if that party actually had the possibility of influencing the part of 
the process in connection with which those events occurred. Hence, 
in the case of procurement risk, the interpretation of what is “beyond 
                                                 
of Goods and the Principles of European Contract Law: A Comparative Analysis, 13 PACE 
INT’L L. REV. 261, n.20 (2001). See also COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) art. 79, ¶¶ 11, 18, 37 (Schlechtriem 
& Schwenzer, eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2010) (although ¶ 27 seems to embrace the 
Germanic tradition).  
30   See supra note 28, at 64. 
31   Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, eds., supra note 29, art. 79, ¶ 11, at n.30. 
32   Sale of Goods Act of 13 May 1988 §27 (Nor.).  
33   Ot.prp. nr. 80 (1986–87), pp. 38 et seq. and, extensively on the 
preparatory works in this context, Viggo Hagstrøm, Obligasjonsrett, § 19.4.2. 
(Universitetsforlaget, 2d. ed., 2011). 
34   See Hagstrøm, supra note 33. For a more extensive analysis, see Giuditta 
Cordero-Moss, Lectures on comparative law of contracts, 166 Institutt for privatretts 
stensilserie bd. 151 et. seq. (2004). 
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the control” is opposite to the outcome under the CISG: the producer 
chose its supplier, and this choice is certainly within the producer’s 
sphere of control (it could have chosen another supplier, and then the 
default would not have happened). However, the producer has no 
actual possibility of influencing the performance of the supplier, 
therefore any impediment in connection therewith is to be deemed 
outside of its sphere of control.35 
In conclusion, the CISG does not seem to provide a uniform 
standard for the interpretation of Force Majeure clauses. 
B.         Interpretation of Entire Agreement Clauses under 
Transnational Law 
The other example of contract term with inconsistent legal 
effects made in Section 2 above, is the Entire Agreement clause. 
This clause is recognised in Article 2.1.17 of the UPICC and 
Article 2:105 of the PECL, with some restrictions: the provisions 
specify that prior statements or agreements may be used to interpret 
the contract. This is one of the applications of the general principle of 
good faith; it is, however, unclear how far the principle of good faith 
goes in overriding the clause inserted by the parties. If prior statements 
and agreements may be used to interpret the contract, does this mean 
that more terms may be added to the contract if, for example, the 
parties have discussed certain specifications at length during the 
negotiations and this has created in one of the parties the reasonable 
                                                 
35   Viggo Hagstrøm supra note 33, § 5.3. Hagstrøm’s interpretation is based 
on a Supreme Court decision rendered in 1970, long before the implementation of 
the CISG in the Norwegian system. However, the Supreme Court’s decision is still 
referred to as correctly incorporating Norwegian law after the enactment of the Sales 
of Goods Act, as the reference made by Hagstrøm confirms. See also Anders 
Mikkelsen, HINDRINGSFRITAK 33 (Gyldendal, 2011). A Supreme Court decision 
affirmed that liability is strict when the goods to be delivered are generic. See HR-
2004-00755-A-Rt-2004-675 (Supreme Court, Dom) (Nor.). The test will then be 
whether the defects objectively are within the sphere of control of the seller. In this 
context, therefore, the Supreme Court has rejected the test of actual control and is 
more in line with the regulation contained in the CISG. This approach is consistent 
with the German tradition, that distinguishes between generic obligations (where 
liability is strict) and specific obligations (where the criterion of diligence applies). 
This distinction was abandoned with the 2002 reform of the BGB. 
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expectation that the specifications would be implied in the contract 
even though they were not included in the final contract text? Article 
1.8 of the UPICC would seem to indicate that this would be the 
preferred approach under the UPICC. According to this provision, a 
party may not act in a way inconsistent with reasonable expectations 
that it has created in the other party. This is spelled out in the PECL, 
Article 2:105, Paragraph 4, which states that, “[a] party may by its 
statements or conduct be precluded from asserting a merger clause36 
to the extent that the other party has reasonably relied on them.” 
According to this logic, the detailed discussion during the 
phase of negotiations of certain characteristics for the products may 
create the reasonable expectation that those specifications have 
become part of the agreement even if they were not written in the 
contract; their subsequent exclusion on the basis of the Entire 
Agreement clause may be deemed to be against good faith. 
According to the opposite logic, however, the very fact that the 
parties have excluded from the text of the contract some specifications 
that were discussed during the negotiations, indicates that no 
agreement was reached on those matters. Exclusion of those terms 
from the contract, combined with the Entire Agreement clause, 
strongly indicates the will of the parties not to be bound by those 
specifications. Their subsequent inclusion on the basis of the good 
faith principle would run counter to the parties’ intention. 
The foregoing shows that the application of the UPICC and of 
the PECL requires a specification of the principle of good faith. Is it 
to be intended as an overriding principle, possibly creating, restricting 
or modifying the obligations that flow from the text of the contract? 
Or is it meant to take the text of the contract as a starting point, 
ensuring that the obligations contained therein are enforced accurately 
and precisely as the parties have envisaged them? This represents the 
dichotomy between, on the one hand, the understanding of fairness as 
a principle ensuring balance between the parties notwithstanding the 
regulation on which the parties may have agreed, and, on the other 
hand, the understanding of fairness as a principle ensuring 
                                                 
36   “Merger clause” is another definition of the Entire Agreement clause, 
which may also be called the “Integration clause.” 
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predictability, and leaving it to the parties to evaluate the desirability of 
their contract regulation. This dichotomy characterises the different 
approaches of the common law and the civilian tradition.37 To enhance 
the ability of the UPICC to harmonize contract law, UNIDROIT has 
created in 1992 a data base collecting court decisions and arbitral 
awards on the various provisions of the UPICC. This is, therefore, the 
best source to turn to when inquiring how to interpret the Entire 
Agreement clause under the UPICC. 
As of 2013, the Unilex database contained five decisions on 
Article 2.1.17 of the UPICC. These decisions are not based on a 
consistent understanding of the standard according to which the clause 
shall be applied.38 The Unilex database shows two approaches to 
Article 2.1.17 of the UPICC: one advocating the primacy of the 
contract’s language, and the other assuming that the UPICC provides 
for the primacy of the real intention of the parties, which in turn may 
lead to considerably restricting the effect of the Entire Agreement 
clause. Evidently, this is not sufficient to give guidance as to which 
approach to choose when addressing the conflict between the 
contract’s language and the principle of good faith. This leaves so 
much room to the discretion of the interpreter that it seems unlikely 
for Article 2.1.17 of the UPICC to give a harmonized regulation of its 
subject-matter. The UPICC, therefore, does not contribute 
considerably to a harmonized standard of interpretation. 
IV.         ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS: FAITHFUL TO THE INTENTION OF THE 
PARTIES 
Above we have seen that the arbitral tribunal may, to a large 
(but not unlimited) extent, disregard the governing law without 
consequences for the validity and enforceability of the award; we have 
also seen that this is not a sufficient answer to the question of how to 
interpret terms of the contract that are not self-explanatory; we have 
further seen that it is not always possible to find a uniform standard of 
interpretation in translation sources. A principle that is often invoked 
                                                 
37   For a more extensive discussion, see INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS, supra note 9, ch. 3. 
38   Id. § 2.4.2.1. 
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in these circumstances is that the arbitral tribunal has a duty to be 
faithful to the will of the parties. 
Does a duty to be faithful to the will of the parties give 
sufficient guidelines? 
The arbitral tribunal may certainly not be inclined to let the 
terms of the contract be overridden by the formalities of the various 
national legal systems, but that does not give an answer to the question 
of how contract terms shall be interpreted. 
We can assume a long-term loan agreement with an Early 
Termination clause permitting immediate termination of the contract 
and consequently the immediate repayment of the whole principal 
upon breach of the obligations contained in a certain clause. 
A literal interpretation of the Early Termination clause permits 
termination even when the breach is insignificant – for example, when 
the borrower has submitted its financial statements to the lender with 
one-day delay.39 The breach may have had no consequences on the 
borrower’s creditworthiness, on its ability to repay the loan, or on the 
lender’s ability to verify these matters; the real reason for the lender to 
terminate the loan may have been that the interest rates had increased 
since the time of signing the loan, and that the lender considered the 
threat of early termination as effective leverage for negotiating a higher 
interest rate. This would not be relevant in a literal interpretation: the 
clause would be considered applicable without regard to the real 
reasons for which it is invoked. 
A purposive interpretation of the clause takes into 
consideration the purpose of the clause and tries to assess whether the 
particular situation may be deemed to fall into the scope of the clause. 
This may lead to considering the clause as not applicable in a situation 
where the reasons for which it is invoked do not correspond to the 
purpose of the clause. 
                                                 
39   The borrower’s obligation to submit its financial statements is usually 
in loan agreements and is generally to be found in the section of the so-called 
covenants. It is meant to make it possible for the lender to control the borrower’s 
continued creditworthiness.  
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What is more faithful to the intention of the parties: a literal 
implementation of the clauses that may permit speculative or abusive 
conduct or an integration of the clauses with considerations of 
business purpose, good faith, and trade usages? There seems to be no 
absolute answer to the question of what interpretation better meets the 
expectations of the parties: a strictly literal interpretation of the terms 
of the contract, or an integration of the contract with principles of 
good faith and commercial sense based on law, trade usages, 
transnational principles or other sources. The former would better 
reflect the parties’ expectations if it is assumed that the parties have 
consciously intended to achieve specific legal effects with each and 
every of the words that they have written in the contract. This, 
however, does not reflect the reality of how contracts are drafted and 
negotiated, as will be seen below. 
A.         The Dynamics of Contract Drafting 
Often, some of the clauses in a contract are inserted without 
the parties having given any particular consideration to their content 
or their effects under the applicable law.40 This practice may be 
surprising, considering the importance that the governing law has for 
the application and even the effectiveness of contract terms, as was 
seen above. However, the practice of negotiating detailed wording 
without regard to the governing law, or even of inserting contract 
clauses without having negotiated them, is not necessarily always 
unreasonable. From a merely legal point of view, it makes little sense, 
but from the overall economic perspective, it is more understandable. 
The gap between the parties’ reliance on the self-sufficiency of the 
contract and the actual legal effects of the contract under the governing 
law does not necessarily derive from the parties’ lack of awareness 
regarding the legal framework surrounding the contract. More 
precisely, the parties may often be aware of the fact that they are 
unaware of the legal framework for the contract. The possibility that 
the wording of the contract is interpreted and applied differently from 
                                                 
40   A more extensive analysis of the practice of contract drafting is made 
in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, supra note 9, ch. 1. 
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what a literal application would seem to suggest may be accepted by 
some parties as a calculated risk.41 
Considerations regarding the internal organization of the 
parties are also a part of the assessment of risk. In large multinational 
companies, risk management may require a certain standardization, 
which in turn prevents a high degree of flexibility in drafting the single 
contracts. In balancing the conflicting interests of ensuring internal 
standardization and permitting local adjustment, large organizations 
may prefer to enhance the former.42 It is, in other words, not 
necessarily the result of thoughtlessness if a contract is drafted without 
having regard for the governing law. Neither is it a symptom of a 
refusal of the applicability of national laws. It is the result of a cost–
benefit evaluation, leading to the acceptance of a calculated legal risk. 
The sophisticated party, aware of the implications of adopting contract 
models that are not adjusted to the governing law and consciously 
assessing the connected risk, will identify the clauses that matter the 
most, and concentrate its negotiations on those, leaving the other 
clauses untouched and accepting the corresponding risk. 
A faithful interpretation of the contract assumes an 
understanding of this uneven approach to contract drafting. 
B.         The Need for Predictability 
On the other hand, predictability is extremely important in 
commercial contracts. The parties are interested in enforcing their 
rights, and, for this purpose, they depend on one or more national legal 
systems and their courts. Therefore, once a contract is finalized, parties 
are interested in its enforceability and in the predictability of the 
parameters according to which enforcement may be achieved.43 
                                                 
41   See more extensively David Echenberg, Negotiating International 
Contracts: Does the Process Invite a Review of Standard Contracts from the Point of View of 
National Legal Requirements?, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10.  
42   See more extensively, Maria Celeste Vettese, Multinational Companies and 
National Contracts, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW , supra note 10. 
43   See QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON SCHOOL OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 2010 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: 
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Litigation lawyers carefully analyse the specific contract and its 
effects under the governing law and try to assess as precisely as possible 
the possibility of winning a case in court or in arbitration on the basis 
of the contract wording, the applicable law and the degree of factual 
background that the governing law allows to bring into the dispute. 
Thus, on the one hand, drafting lawyers, while negotiating a contract, 
may have willingly disregarded the legal effects of some clauses. On 
the other hand, litigation lawyers, while assessing enforceability of the 
same contract, will carefully study its legal effects under the governing 
law.  The varying degree of awareness during negotiations, thus, must 
be considered in light of the need for predictability once a dispute 
arises. 
Furthermore, contracts are often meant to circulate, for 
example, because they are assigned to third parties, are used as security, 
or serve as a basis for calculating insurance premiums. In these 
situations, it is essential that contracts are interpreted strictly in 
accordance with their terms: third parties are not aware of and should 
not be assumed to take into consideration the relationship between the 
original parties to the contract, what the original parties may have 
assumed or intended, or any circumstances that relate to the original 
parties and that may have had an impact on these parties’ interests. It 
is, therefore, expected that a contract is interpreted primarily, if not 
exclusively, in light of its terms – without considering things such as 
what a fair balance between the parties’ interests would be or what one 
party’s expectations might have been. 
C.         How to Square the Circle: The Applicable Law 
The arbitral tribunal is, therefore, expected to understand the 
dynamics of negotiations in order to properly give effect to the 
intention of the parties. Blindly applying the wording of the contract 
without any regard to the principles of the governing law or, to the 
extent that they are determinable and applicable, of transnational law, 
would not necessarily reflect the true intention of the parties if the 
clause that is being applied literally is one of the boilerplate clauses that 
                                                 
CHOICES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CHOICES IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 13 (2010). See also THE LAW SOCIETY, LAW SOCIETY REPORT: FIRMS’ 
CROSS-BORDER WORK 1, 8 (2010).  For further references, see INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, supra note 9, § 2.1.  
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the parties did not consider. Integrating or correcting a clause with 
national or transnational principles, on the other hand, might not 
necessarily reflect the parties’ intention either, if the clause that is being 
interpreted is one of the clauses that the parties carefully negotiated. 
Leaving broad discretion to the interpreter, however, runs the 
risk of undermining predictability, if the criteria for exercising such 
discretion are not clearly determinable. As was seen above, 
interpretation of the contract should take into consideration the need 
for predictability. Overriding the terms of the contract in the name of 
principles of good faith or equity, thus, would lead to results that are 
not compatible with the expectations of international business 
practice, if the standards that are applied are not clearly determinable. 
From the overview made in Section 3 above, it seems that the standard 
of good faith is not sufficiently determinable on a transnational level. 
This seems to speak for the advisability of taking into consideration 
the criteria developed in the applicable law. 
D.        Variety of Approaches 
There is no uniform answer to the question of what 
interpretation is the most faithful to the parties’ intentions. A seminar 
organised at the University of Oslo in 201144 discussed the arbitrators’ 
approach to the interpretation of contracts and identified a variety of 
approaches.45 The results of this seminar are summarised below. 
Contracts are not necessarily always applied in strict 
accordance with their terms. There are different degrees of 
interference and the sources of the interference also vary quite 
considerably. There is a scale moving from a strict application of the 
governing law to integrate the contract, via interpretation of the 
contract terms in the context of transnational soft law principles such 
                                                 
44   See Arbitration and Party Autonomy (APA), supra note 9. The 
programme for the seminar, the list of panel participants and the transcript from the 
panel discussions are available at 
http://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/english/research/projects/choice-of-
law/events/2011/2011-arbitration-and-the-not-unlimited-party-autonomy.html. 
45   See INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, supra note 9, ch. 3, § 
7; see also Giuditta Cordero-Moss, Interpretation of Contracts in International Commercial 
Arbitration: Diversity on More than One Level, 22 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 13, 13-36 (2014).  
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as the UPICC and the PECL (which are heavily based on the principle 
of good faith and may give rise to a substantial possibility of interfering 
with the contract language), to interpretation of the contract on the 
basis of its own terms combined with the parties’ interests and trade 
usages, to interpretation of the contract solely on the basis of its own 
terms. There is also a further approach to interpretation of the 
contract, which goes under the label of “splitting the baby.” This 
Solomonic approach consists of rendering an award in the middle 
range between the claims of each of the parties. This is not necessarily 
based on a literal consideration of the contract terms or on an 
integration of the contract with other sources, but simply on the desire 
to accommodate both parties.46 Interestingly, there does not seem to 
be a uniform perception of the frequency of this approach: a recent 
empirical study shows that the parties to arbitration perceive that they 
got a Solomonic award in 18–20% of the cases, whereas the arbitrators 
perceive that they take this kind of equitable decision in only 5% of the 
cases.47 This, therefore, adds a new variable to the equation of the 
interpretation of contracts. Not only is it uncertain whether the 
arbitrators will interpret the contract literally, whether they will use 
sources of law, or whether they will apply transnational principles to 
give a more purposive interpretation, but it is also possible that the 
decision will be influenced by equitable considerations that are not 
based on the contract or on other legal sources. 
CONCLUSION 
Party autonomy is limited in international arbitration, in spite 
of the widespread opinion that contracts are self-sufficient and that, 
together with arbitration, they create a closed circuit that manages to 
leave national law out. 
First of all, the legal framework for arbitration ensures that 
arbitration enjoys a significant autonomy, but this autonomy is not 
unlimited. If the losing party decides not to comply with the arbitral 
                                                 
46   This appears in the 2012 Survey of the School of International 
Arbitration of Queen Mary University of London. QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF 
LONDON AND WHITE & CASE, 2012 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: 
CURRENT AND PREFERRED PRACTICES IN THE ARBITRAL PROCESS § 7 (2012).  
47   Queen Mary University, supra note 46, at 38. 
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award, courts of law may exercise judicial control. Judicial control on 
arbitration is restricted, but there is room for overriding party 
autonomy in several respects. 
Furthermore, even within the area where no judicial control 
may be exercised and arbitration is autonomous, the necessity may 
arise to integrate contract terms with external sources. Contract terms 
do not always have an absolute meaning with legal effects flowing 
directly from the words, and recourse to a legal framework may be 
required to interpret the terms and to define their legal effects. To the 
extent that transnational sources provide a uniform legal framework, 
they may integrate the contract and reinstate self-sufficiency. Where 
transnational sources are not sufficient, however, the arbitral tribunal 
will have to integrate the contract with external principles and rules, 
primarily stemming from the governing law. 
All the above constitutes limitations to party autonomy in 
arbitration. 
 
